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Abstract
Reviewing recent developments in nuclear energy, it is clear that Northeast Asian countries have become
the leading customers and suppliers of nuclear technology worldwide. However, regional cooperation in
the nuclear field remains inadequate when compared to the close economic interaction between these
states and their need for solutions to pressing issues, such as supply assurance and spent fuel
management. At the same time, with events like the Fukushima accident or the ongoing nuclear crisis in
North Korea, there is an urgent demand for Northeast Asia to improve the safety, security, and
nonproliferation status of the regional nuclear programs as any nuclear-related incident in any regional
state will have transnational impact on the economic and social stability of the whole region. Based on the
status of nuclear power development and regional nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia, this paper
analyzes the common need for better safety, security, and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and
facilities in the region. Just as cooperation in improving these issues can serve as a breakthrough for
broader regional cooperation in the nuclear field, several opportunities for the establishment of a regional
framework for nuclear cooperation are also identified based on current cooperation mechanisms like the
Nuclear Security Summit or the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). Such
cooperative efforts will likely face challenges from the political animosity among Northeast Asian states.
But consistent efforts from all parties, with focus on practical issues, will increase its chance of success,
thus creating a safer, more secure atmosphere in nuclear Northeast Asian facilities, eliminating any
proliferation purpose and serving as the basis for sustainable development of nuclear power, both
regionally and globally.

I.

Introduction

In the past two decades, countries in the Northeast Asian region, such as China, Japan, and the Republic
of Korea (ROK), have emerged as the new engines for the peaceful development of nuclear power
worldwide. However currently, there are few regional cooperation activities in the nuclear field between
these countries despite the apparent needs and potentials for such cooperation. The following discussion
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reviews the status of nuclear power development in Northeast Asia and the position taken by regional
states on the idea of multinational nuclear cooperation.
A.

Nuclear power in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is currently the fastest growing region in the world in terms of nuclear power
development. Until the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in March 2011,
Japan had been the leading nuclear power country in Asia with 50 operational units. However, the
Japanese nuclear power program was mostly halted after the accident, and the restart process has only
recently been initiated at the Sendai-1 and Sendai-2 NPPs [1]. In addition, Japan has signed an agreement
with Vietnam on the construction of two nuclear power units and is promoting its technologies in other
countries.
Following Japan, ROK has gradually built up its nuclear power fleet since the 1970s. It now has 24
operational units and another four units under construction [2]. Expert nuclear security analysts project
that the nuclear generation capacity in ROK will surpass Japan’s by 2035 [3]. ROK has also succeeded in
developing its own nuclear technology, and it made headlines in 2009 by winning the contract to build
four APR1400 units for the United Arab Emirates as well as another contract for a research reactor in
Jordan.
Despite its status as a nuclear weapon state since 1964, China started its civil nuclear program later than
Japan and ROK. However, China has since emerged as a leading country in global nuclear development
with 28 operational units and another 24 under construction (IAEA, Power Reactor Information System
(PRIS), 2015). China has also exported NPPs to Pakistan, and it has provided financing for nuclear power
projects in the United Kingdom, Romania, and Argentina.
Although all three major states in Northeast Asia possess advanced capabilities in nuclear technology,
their nuclear industries still depend on out-of-region supply sources for natural uranium and fuel cycle
services, like enrichment [4].
Not generally considered a Northeast Asian state, Russian is included in this analysis because its
territories are geographically located in this region. With 34 operational nuclear units and the current most
successful nuclear exporter in the global market, Russia also has a significant nuclear presence in the
region. Russia’s Northeast Asian presence includes multiple NPP construction projects in China,
exploration activities in Mongolia, and enrichment service contracts with Japan [5].
Aside from these four major nuclear power states, the territory of Taiwan has a considerable nuclear fleet
with 6 operational units and 2 units under construction. North Korea (DPRK), on the other hand, once had
a civilian nuclear program, which mostly served as a cover for its proliferation attempts [6]. Lastly,
Mongolia, being the only Northeast Asian state without significant nuclear activities, still possesses
experience in uranium exploration and has actively participated in regional nonproliferation dialogues.
The current and future development of nuclear power in Northeast Asian states is summarized in Figure
1.
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Figure 1.Current nuclear installed capacities (unit: MWe) and projections (high scenario) through 2035 in Northeast
Asian states [3, 7]

B.

Multinational approach in nuclear cooperation

One solution to balance the demand for peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and the need to prevent the
proliferation of the technology for military purposes is known as a multinational approach (MNA). This
model has been proposed since the early days of nuclear energy on the basis that the technology should be
managed not by individual countries, but by a community of state-level technology users. This kind of
cooperation mechanism ensures that individual countries can access the benefits of peaceful applications
of nuclear technology while the community would collectively eliminate any proliferation intention. After
World War II, the United States (U.S.) proposed the Baruch Plan (1946), intending to establish an
international regime to control the application of atomic energy. Since then, numerous MNAs have been
proposed at the international and regional levels, focusing on nonproliferation, which has led to the
establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and
Oceania. Born out of the need for a sustainable and economic supply of fuel cycle services, several fuel
cycle-related MNAs have also operated successfully in Europe. These include the EURATOM nuclear
community to ensure safeguards and fuel supply in European states, the multinational corporations
URENCO and EURODIF in uranium enrichment, and the EUROCHEMIC consortium in spent fuel
reprocessing.
Recently, there has been a new wave of MNA proposals in the nuclear field aiming at the assurance of
nuclear fuel supply, thus discouraging individual states from developing sensitive technologies like
enrichment and nuclear reprocessing (ENR). Among these proposals, the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) recent collaborations with Russia (the International Uranium Enrichment Centre –
IUEC), and Kazakhstan (the Nuclear Fuel Bank) can be considered the most successful [8, 9].
As mentioned previously, none of the Northeast Asian states have totally self-sustainable nuclear
programs. In addition, countries with limited landmass and considerable public opposition to nuclear
power and disposal facility siting, such as ROK and Taiwan, have grappled with the question of spent fuel
management. Furthermore, the region has been marred by the DPRK nuclear crisis since the early 1990s.
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Various MNA schemes have been proposed by regional parties to resolve these issues, including
nonproliferation and export control regimes (like ASIATOM, or PACATOM) and fuel supply assurance
and spent fuel management entities (like the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centre). However, no proposal has been
successfully realized, partly due to both the lack of concrete interests by countries in the region and due to
their enduring political and social animosities [10].
Considering the highly integrated economies of the region and the urgent demand for fuel supply and
spent fuel management solutions, the lack of progress in implementing a nuclear MNA in Northeast Asia
needs to become a central focus. The following Sections address the current status of safety, security, and
nonproliferation in Northeast Asia. It also addresses how an MNA in these areas can resolve cooperation
dilemmas.

II.

Status of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation
in Northeast Asian states
A.

Nuclear safety

After the Fukushima accident in 2011, numerous nuclear safety issues in Japan have been revealed, such
as its defective regulatory structure and the lack of a proper safety culture [11]. As a result, the IAEA has
strongly recommended its Member States provide their safety regulators with an effective independence
from the nuclear operators. However, in Northeast Asia only the Korean and Russian safety regulatory
bodies (the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission – NSSC in ROK and the Federal Environmental,
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service – Rostechnadzor in Russia) have operated independently since
2011 and 2012, respectively. Their Chinese and Japanese counterparts (the National Nuclear Safety
Administration – NNSA in China, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority – NRA in Japan) are not totally
independent as they still belong to the environmental protection ministries in these countries.
In addition, ROK has recently experienced some serious incidents related to nuclear safety and safety
culture, such as the concealment of a station black-out at the Kori-1 NPP in 2012 and the falsification of
quality certificates for equipment at numerous NPPs [12]. These incidents have not only altered the
operation of ROK’s nuclear fleet but have also caused strong negative reactions from the public.
The rapid expansion of the Chinese nuclear power program has also created concerns regarding the
construction quality of the new NPPs in China, the plants’ technologies being supplied by different
countries. Such use of different technologies for different NPPs can create a disparity between the tight
construction schedule and the inspection capabilities of the competent authorities [13].
The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP has shown once again that “a nuclear accident anywhere is a
nuclear accident everywhere” [14]. As the number of NPPs in Northeast Asia is still growing rapidly,
even after the accident, maintaining the safety of the nuclear fleet in each state is a pressing issue not only
to that country, but also for the whole region.
B.

Nuclear security

The status of nuclear security in Northeast Asian states is summarized in Table 1. Except for DPRK, all
regional states have actively participated in the international efforts to enhance nuclear security and to
prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Russia and China have been exposed to significantly higher risks of
terrorist attacks than other countries in the region. In China, terrorist activities have even increased
noticeably in recent years [15].
Table 1. Terrorism risk, nuclear security status, and adherence to international regimes related to nuclear security of
Northeast Asian states.
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Country
China
Taiwan8
ROK
DPRK
Japan
Mongolia
Russia

Terror casualty
20141
1068
0
0
0
0
0
2443

GTI
20142
5.21
0.31
0
0
0.01
0
6.76

NTI
20143

CPPNM4 and
CPPNM Amend5

ICSANT6

CoC7

64

yes

yes

yes

63
82
30
76
69
66

yes
no
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
yes
no
yes

In the case of nuclear terrorism, Russia was once a hot spot of nuclear security concerns after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but its situation has been improved significantly, partly due to its active
collaboration with the U.S. and other international organizations. However, the risk of illicit transfers of
nuclear materials remains a critical concern to Russia, whereas the recent political rift between Russia and
the U.S. has the potential to negatively affect the progress in improving Russian nuclear security [16]. In
China, experts have assessed that the threat from nuclear terrorism is low; however, the recent terrorist
activities by separatist groups have also created some concerns about the security of the Chinese nuclear
facilities [17].
In other regional states with lower risks of terrorism like Japan and ROK, there still exist numerous
nuclear security issues. In the early 1990s, the cult Aum Shinrikyo threatened Japan’s security; Japan’s
plutonium stockpile, which will likely grow larger in the near future given the stagnancy of the Japanese
nuclear program, may become a target of nuclear terrorism [18]. As for ROK, the recent cyber-attack on
the computer system of the South Korean nuclear operator KHNP, which was possibly initiated by
DPRK, its main security threat, also raises concern about the security of the country’s growing nuclear
power program in case of further attacks by state or non-state actors [19].
Given the transnational characteristics of terrorism and the devastating impact of potential nuclear
terrorist attacks on the economy and society of regional states, nuclear security should be considered a
priority in the cooperation agenda in Northeast Asia.

1

Five-year total casualties as of 2014, including both deaths and injuries, due to acts of terrorism. Data taken from
the Global Terrorism Database [15] (START, 2015).
2
2014 Global Terrorism Index. Country is scored on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being “no impact of terrorism” and 10
being “highest impact of terrorism”.
33
2014 NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index. Country is scored on a scale of 0-100 with 100 being “most favorable
nuclear materials security conditions”.
4
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Country is noted “yes” if it is a signatory to the
Convention and has put it into force.
5
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM Amendment). Country is
noted “yes” if it has put into force this Amendment.
6
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Country is noted “yes” if it is a
signatory to the Convention and has put it into force.
7
IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Resolution No. GC(47)/RES/7.B).
Country is noted “yes” if it has official announcement on the commitment to the Code of Conduct.
8
Due to the “One China” policy, Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state by the United Nations and the IAEA,
and thus cannot become a party to the CPPNM or join the CoC.
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C.

Nuclear nonproliferation

Not only a focal point of nuclear power development, Northeast Asia is also one of the most critical
regions of the nonproliferation regime with two de jure nuclear weapon states (Russia and China), one de
facto nuclear weapon state (DPRK), and five states/sovereign with active civil nuclear program. Three of
these (Russia, China, and Japan) have complete nuclear fuel cycles. In particular, the nuclear weapons
program of DPRK has undermined both the safeguards efforts by the IAEA and the effectiveness of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. DPRK has also defied, numerous times, the international efforts on
denuclearization, among which the KEDO project (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)
was once considered a promising case for MNA for nuclear fuel cycle in the region. Given the DPRK’s
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons as a security assurance measure and its political isolation, the nuclear
crisis here will likely remain a critical issue in the region for some time.
Besides, there are other regional nonproliferation issues, such as the Japanese inventory of plutonium
from reprocessing, which has been considered a regional concern by its neighbors despite the strong
commitment of Japan to IAEA safeguards [20]. Northeast Asia is also one of the few regions in the world
that do not have a functional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty similar to the Semei Treaty for Central Asia
or the Rarotonga Treaty for the Oceanic states. Moreover, one can see that the tensions over the territorial
and maritime disputes between Japan and China, or between ROK and Japan, have increased in recent
years. Such intense rivalries and the unresolved nuclear crisis in DPRK can be catalyst for a regional arm
race and even proliferation intentions in Northeast Asia. Therefore, it is essential for Northeast Asian
countries to enhance the nonproliferation status of the region, including improving the transparency of
each country’s nuclear program, coordinating in the DPRK nuclear issue, and soon establishing a treaty
on nuclear weapon-free zone. The only visible solution is an effective MNA.
Based on the conditions and needs in the region regarding nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation as
outlined by this discussion, opportunities for a functional multinational framework in Northeast Asia and
challenges that may lie ahead are identified in the next Section. Also included are some suggestions on
practical measures for its implementation.

III. Nuclear multinational approach in Northeast Asia
revisited
A.

Challenges and opportunities for a nuclear multinational
framework in Northeast Asia

As discussed in the previous Sections, the political and social tension between regional states has
impeded attempts to realize a nuclear MNA scheme in Northeast Asia. Given the recently heightened
territorial disputes and unresolved historical issues over the Japanese legacy during the World War II, it
will be very difficult for regional countries to find a common voice in such a sensitive issue as
nonproliferation. Therefore, limiting a nuclear multinational framework to nuclear safety and security
cooperation should be a feasible starting point.
The cooperation platform Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), which has been
advocated by the Korea Government since 2014, can be used as a springboard for such a nuclear MNA.
The basis of this regional initiative, in the words of the President of Korea Park Geun-hye, is cooperation
in practical areas such as climate change, disaster relief, nuclear safety, and transnational crime, following
the cooperation model of the European Union [21]. Given the political and social sensitivity of any
nuclear-related issue, government-to-government nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia that is similar to
the European nuclear community EURATOM may be unlikely at the moment. However, nuclear safety
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and security cooperation in the form of a working group under NAPCI is not an unrealistic option, as seen
by the Northeast Asian Top Regulators Meeting (TRM) of the trio China-Japan-ROK that has taken place
annually since 2008. The working-group level at the beginning of the process would also allow the
participation of Taiwan, a considerable nuclear user in the region, as contributor and benefactor of
regional efforts to enhance nuclear safety and security, all the while maintaining the “One China” policy,
thus fostering the essential support from China.
It is necessary that such a nuclear cooperation mechanism is incrementally built, which will ensure a
higher level of participation from regional governments as the MNA is developed. Any nuclear-related
cooperation can only achieve sustaining effectiveness with government endorsement from regional states.
Such a cooperation mechanism will be likely supported by the U.S., which has actively called for global
efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. The U.S. also desires a cooperative and stable climate in
Northeast Asia between two of its closest allies, ROK and Japan, and its major commercial partner,
China.
The area most in need of an MNA cooperation framework in Northeast Asia, however, is nuclear
nonproliferation. Regional rivalries and the dispute over a solution for the DPRK nuclear crisis have
prevented Northeast Asian states from establishing a consensus on this subject. Here the breakthrough
may only come from gradual rapprochement driven by the top leaders’ willingness to cooperate, as was
shown in the case of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC). This mutual safeguards mechanism between the rivals Argentina and Brazil was successfully
developed by increasing nuclear cooperation, improving security and cooperation climate, and building
mutual confidence [22]. Another good example for Northeast Asia is the success achieved by the U.S.Russia cooperation to remove highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuels from research reactors around the
world. This program has helped eliminating the risk of these weapon-usable materials being taken by
terrorists. Such collaboration prevailed despite the increasing political differences between the U.S. and
Russia, proving that the interest in finding solutions for practical nuclear issues can help countries
overcome political tensions and cooperates with each other.
This type of cooperative framework in nonproliferation can also involve DPRK through conditional
security and economic benefits based on its gradual steps towards abandoning the nuclear weapons
program. Again, the support from the U.S. for such MNA is necessary, and achievable, as it can provide
an alternative for the U.S. to indirectly deal with the DPRK nuclear crisis. Furthermore, this
nonproliferation-based MNA can be expanded to encompass cooperation in nuclear fuel supply and
services, which are much needed by regional players.
B.

First steps for a feasible nuclear MNA in Northeast Asia

From the practical point of view, there are numerous ways to implement a Northeast Asian MNA. In the
case of nuclear safety, the European Union (EU) has proven to be a good example of establishing a
legally binding and robust regional regulatory framework under the umbrella of EURATOM, which is
assisted by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) - an advisory group focusing on
cooperation and transparency in nuclear safety, and the Western European Nuclear Regulators’
Association (WENRA) - a professional network of nuclear regulators in Europe. The European model has
been recently proposed by ROK for Northeast Asia. Its feasibility is considerable given the willingness of
the region’s leaders and public to support a cooperative measure in nuclear safety.
In case of nuclear security, regional cooperation can start from the commitments made by regional states
at the Nuclear Security Summits. Such commitments by China, ROK, and Japan at the 2010 Summit have
led to the establishment of the first three regional Centers of Excellence in nuclear security in Northeast
Asia. These include the State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC) of China, the International
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Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of ROK, and the Integrated Support Center for
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of Japan. So far these centers have carried out
cooperation activities at the organizational level, mainly focusing on human resources development [23].
If this form of organization-to-organization cooperation is developed further with support from respective
governments, it can also serve as the coordination seed for regional cooperation in nuclear security at
higher levels.
Finally, a practical opportunity for cooperation in nuclear security and nonproliferation may lie in the
management of spent fuel. One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident is the vulnerability of
the spent fuel pool in case of accident or terrorist attacks and the tremendous environmental and
psychological impacts that may follow such incidents. The management of spent fuel is also a
nonproliferation question, as reflected through the lengthy negotiation between the U.S. and ROK on their
renewed nuclear cooperation agreement related to the issue of pyroprocessing. In Northeast Asia, ROK
and Taiwan have already encountered difficulties with the management of spent fuel. Given the growing
number of decommissioning NPPs due to the downsizing of the nuclear fleet, Japan will probably have to
deal with similar issues in the near future. Therefore, it will be beneficial for regional countries to
cooperate in enhancing the security and nonproliferation of the spent fuel management facilities. Efforts
should be made to engage DPRK in this type of cooperative approach, as any security-related incident at
its nuclear complex will have negative impact on regional states. Such engagement is of interest not only
to ROK, which will be directly affected by any nuclear-related incident in DPRK, but also from China,
which has particular concerns about the transfer of DPRK’s nuclear weapon technology and weaponusable nuclear materials to non-state actors [24].
Regional involvement in the form of information sharing and consultation to ensure the security of the
Japanese plutonium inventory may also be a potential MNA scheme. It will help Japan to lower the risk
of terrorist attack on or material theft from the outside while alleviating other countries’ proliferation
concerns, thanks to a higher level of information transparency. Similar information transparency will be
essential to the proliferation resistance of the pyroprocessing technology, which has been under
development in ROK as a solution for spent fuel management.

IV. Conclusions
As the nuclear industries in the U.S. and Europe have stayed in relative stagnant for over two decades,
Northeast Asia has become the locomotive of worldwide nuclear power development. However, the
history of nuclear cooperation within the region has proven to be much less successful, partly due to
numerous regional rivalries and the lack of tangible interests. A multinational approach (MNA) in the
issues of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation provides a possible breakthrough in nuclear
cooperation for Northeast Asia. As any nuclear-related incident, such as accidents at NPPs, terrorist
attacks on nuclear facilities, or the use of nuclear materials for military purposes, would have devastating
and transnational impacts on the economy and societies of the Northeast Asian states, the improvement of
safety, security, and nonproliferation of the regional nuclear programs is essential and requires collective
efforts from regional players. The paper also provides some cooperation mechanisms that may help such
MNA effort surpass the existing political barriers in order to create a practical and effective approach.
The realization of an MNA in nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation requires continuous and
consistent efforts from and coordination among all countries in Northeast Asia. Once implemented, such
an MNA would benefit the region and the international community—not only by enhancing the safety
and security of the fastest-growing nuclear market in the world, but also by creating a basis for a broader
nuclear MNA in Northeast Asia that can help the region continue to benefit from nuclear energy in a safe,
secured, sustainable, and peaceful way.
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